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Abstract 
This article critiques and builds upon first-wave (Höpner and Schäfer 2010) and second-wave 
(Johnston and Regan 2018) European Integration and comparative capitalisms literatures which posit 
convergence towards a single model of capitalism or growth. It utilises the case study of France to 
explore the impact of European integration and disintegration on national models of capitalism in the 
post-crisis era. The article focuses on the impact of integrative and disintegrative dynamics on 
France’s ‘state-industry-finance nexus’, putting forward three core claims. First, French capitalism is 
not accurately captured by the above frameworks and remains better characterised by the concept of 
post-dirigisme. Indeed, comparative capitalisms debates must move beyond a simple bifurcation of 
capitalist types. Second, European integrative pressures must be viewed as fragmented, 
differentiating, mediated by domestic state actors and productive of capitalist variegation and 
hybridisation. Countering functionalist tendencies within this literature, it shows how different 
conceptions of state-market relations crucially mediate the relationship between national capitalisms 
and European integration. Finally, in the context of Brexit, the dynamics of European disintegration – 
an issue not discussed so far in these debates – is contributing to a variegated and multi-directional 
process of capitalist restructuring in post-crisis France. 
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A full decade after the global financial crisis (GFC) began, despite a brief upturn in 2017, 
many economies in Europe are still experiencing slow economic growth. As a result of 
austerity measures and the European Union’s (EU) push for structural reform, Europe’s 
economies have undergone adjustment and reorganisation, ironically often entrenching 
features of the failed pre-crisis regimes (see Johnston and Regan 2018; Grant and Wilson 
(eds) 2012; Green et al. (eds) 2015; Lavery 2018). In addition to these decade-long reforms, 
the UK’s decision to leave the EU will likely disrupt established trade and regulatory 
regimes. This new dynamic of European disintegration could produce further political 
economic upheaval and ‘repoliticise’ and/or reshape domestic growth models (see Rosamond 
2018; 2016; Vollaard 2014; Zielonka 2014; Jones 2018). This article utilises the case study of 
France to explore the impact of European integration and disintegration on comparative 
capitalisms in the post-crisis era.  
The first-wave (Höpner and Schäfer 2010) and second-wave (Johnston and Regan 
2018) literatures exploring the relationship between European integration and comparative 
models of European capitalism are ill-equipped to explain Europe’s post-crisis capitalist 
restructuring in France and elsewhere for four principal reasons. First, the existing literatures 
point to two opposite and contradictory conclusions regarding the model of capitalism EU 
integrative dynamics promote: one suggests a liberal market economy (Höpner and Schäfer 
2010), whilst the other points towards particular export-led growth models associated with 
coordinated market economies (Johnston and Regan 2018). Second, these accounts are 
underpinned by pre-existing frameworks – varieties of capitalism (VoC) (Hall and Soskice 
2001) and the ‘growth models’ (GM) perspective (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016) – which 
both promote a parsimonious bifurcated vision of European capitalisms. These overlook the 
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ongoing variegation and hybridisation within European models of capitalism and, in 
particular, cannot capture the continuing specificities of the French post-dirigiste political 
economy (see Clift 2007, 2016; Howell 2009; Levy 2008; Schmidt 2002). These first two 
limitations lead to a third: existing frameworks overstate and frame in too narrow terms the 
impact of European integration on national capitalisms, viewing its impact as straightforward 
convergence on a single model of capitalism. It is more accurate, we suggest, to view this 
process as fragmented, differentiating, mediated by domestic state actors and productive of 
capitalist variegation and hybridisation. Finally, underpinned by a teleological assumption of 
ever-increasing integration, these frameworks are unable to account for the potentially 
significant implications of European disintegration.  
This article critiques and engages existing frameworks by making three core claims. 
First, the European political economy is more diverse than a simple bifurcation of capitalist 
types – a long-standing critique of the VoC literature (Amable 2003; Crouch 2005; Hay 
2004), advanced with particular verve by scholars of France (see Schmidt 2002) yet which 
bears re-iterating in light of the new growth models perspective reproducing the binary optic. 
Second, European integrative pressures must be viewed as multifaceted, sometimes pulling in 
different directions, and often mediated by domestic state actors. We draw upon 
‘constructivist institutionalism’ (CI) (Hay 2008; 2017) in order to understand the impact of, 
and explore the relationship between, institutional and ideational factors. We contend that it 
is important to account for ideational factors, notably the conception of state-market relations, 
and their impact on capitalist restructuring, as well as the form of capitalism/growth being 
promoted through integrative pressures. For instance, in the area of industrial strategy, the EU 
promotes a particular ordoliberal conception of state-market relations, which contrasts with 
more dirigiste approaches pursued by French state actors. We thus utilise this CI approach to 
counter functionalist tendencies in the existing first and second wave literature by 
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demonstrating how ideational factors crucially mediate the relationship between national 
capitalisms and European integration, drawing particular attention to the concept of post-
dirigisme (see Clift 2012; Schmidt 2002). Finally, amidst Brexit, the French state is actively 
responding to the dynamics of European disintegration to augur a partial shift towards a more 
liberal model of capitalism in the area of finance. Pressures of European disintegration, like 
those of integration, contribute to a variegated and multi-directional process of capitalist 
restructuring in post-crisis France. This has, we suggest, significant implications for future 
research in the field of comparative capitalisms. 
This article moves beyond the firm-focused ontology of traditional VoC literature, 
with its empirical ‘manufacturing bias’ (Blyth 2003: 222), and which neglects the role of the 
state. Instead, we focus on the ‘state-industry-finance nexus’, exploring the links between the 
French state, aspirations for industrial renewal and processes of financial re-regulation. We 
draw upon in-depth analysis of primary documentary material (e.g. government and 
parliamentary speeches and reports, manufacturing and finance industry organisation reports, 
media accounts, think tank analysis), and information from over 30 elite interviews with 
French government advisors, parliamentarians and financial actors carried out during two 
separate research phases in 2016-17 and 2018. The selection of this primary documentary and 
interview material is designed to enable us to explore the interface of EU (dis)-integrative 
dynamics and national capitalist restructuring since 2012, under the administrations of 
François Hollande and Emmanuel Macron (though see Clift 2012; Schmidt 2012 for more on 
the Sarkozy period). In particular, we explore state financing for industrial renewal, as well as 
the so-called ‘state shareholder strategy’ programme, and the French state’s regulatory and 
taxation reforms in relation to financial capital, both pre- and post- the Brexit vote. We trace 
institutional developments over the course of the post-crash period in these areas, developing 
a better understanding the way in which key political actors in France have made sense of and 
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engaged with the economic environment and thus what impact this has had on the nature of 
French capitalism during the period analysed. We thus analyse attempts by French state 
actors to implement domestic policy or to shape European-level policy in the areas of 
industrial strategy and financial capitalism, and ultimately what this tells us about the 
contemporary nature of France’s model of capitalism. 
The article first critiques the existing literature and explores the contribution of the 
concept of post-dirigisme, before setting out our empirical analysis of the ‘state-industry-
finance nexus’. A final section considers the implications for comparative capitalisms work 
and research on the impact of European integration and disintegration within Europe’s 
political economies. 
EU Integration and its implications for capitalist diversity  
First wave: the triumph of the liberal market economy 
A first wave of the literature exploring the implications of European integration for capitalist 
diversity found that European integration favours evolution towards the Anglo-Saxon or 
liberal market economy model (Höpner and Schäfer 2007; 2010). Höpner and Schäfer’s 
analytical framework is premised upon earlier Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) scholarship, 
which identifies two prevailing ideal-types of capitalism, the liberal (LME) and the co-
ordinated market economy (CME) (Hall and Soskice 2001: 1-70). EU integration in this 
reading targets the CME ‘production regime’ and is ‘transforming national institutions and 
bringing them in line with the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism’ and eroding capitalist 
diversity (Höpner and Schäfer 2010: 344, 351; 2007: 6). This dynamic generates political 
tension or what Callaghan and Höpner (2005) call a ‘clash of capitalisms’, crystallising into 
‘contending conceptions of the internal market’ and ‘contending conceptions of capitalism in 
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Europe’. The resultant ideological struggle pits ‘the neoliberal project’ against ‘regulated 
capitalism’ and Europe as an ‘organized [economic] space’ (Hooghe and Marks 1999: 74-9, 
82-91; Wincott 2003: 292-4; Rosamond 2002). One flashpoint was around takeover 
regulation (see Callaghan and Höpner 2005, Clift 2009a), others include regulations applying 
to labour markets, traveling workers, and companies.  
Fioretos (2012: 303) finds that this clash of capitalisms has been a structural feature of 
the European political economy for decades. Höpner and Schäfer (2010: 350-1), however, 
identify a qualitative shift wherein European integration has only recently begun to 
destabilise national varieties of capitalism. They posit a new, ‘post-Ricardian’ phase of 
European integration ‘in which the Commission’s and the European Court of Justice’s 
(ECJ’s) attempts to promote economic integration systematically challenge the institutions of 
organised capitalism’, thereby ‘leaving the Ricardian logic of diversity and comparative 
advantages behind’ in favour of LME convergence (Höpner and Schäfer 2010: 344, 350-1). 
In Höpner and Schäfer’s account, the EU sees the institutions of organised capitalism 
‘as barriers to full economic union’ (Höpner and Schäfer 2010: 351). Their analysis carefully 
specifies the actors and mechanisms inducing the shift. The Commission, EU Directives and 
the ECJ through its rulings, and particular readings of ‘non-discrimination’, ‘mutual 
recognition’, have been ‘engines of liberalisation’, delivering what Höpner and Schäfer term 
a ‘radicalised interpretation of the ‘four freedoms’ (of goods, capital, services and labour)’ 
(2010: 349). The EC, and doctrines of ‘direct effect’ and ECJ ‘supremacy’ are key 
mechanisms changing Europe’s capitalisms. Höpner and Schäfer assume ongoing integration 
drivers which will press ever forwards and interpret an unambiguous LME direction of travel 
for European capitalist convergence. 
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Second-wave: the dominance of German export-led growth  
In a recent special issue in New Political Economy, Johnston and Regan (2018) set out an 
ambitious new framework for understanding capitalist diversity within the EU. Rather than 
VoC, their framework draws upon Baccaro and Pontusson’s (2016) ‘growth models’ (GM) 
perspective in conceptualising the EU ‘as a union of two different growth models’: an export-
led growth model, typical of Germany, and a consumption-led model (either wage or credit 
fuelled), as in the UK. Their account contends that in the post-crisis environment, the 
liberalising trajectory of European integration punishes economies ‘traditionally reliant on 
wage or credit growth to generate aggregate demand’ and rather promotes a manufacturing 
and/or high-tech export growth model (Johnston and Regan 2018: 154).  
Johnston and Regan list seven mechanisms which they suggest are ‘explicitly 
designed to promote economic “convergence”’ on the ordoliberal export-led model of 
growth: monetary integration via the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) and 
euro; financial market integration; downward wage pressure enhanced by the free movement 
of labour; austerity policies institutionalised through fiscal rules; the promotion of a particular 
conception of export growth and high-tech skills development; the mandating of structural 
supply-side reform; and, directives and regulations on tax and competition laws (Johnston 
and Regan 2018: 148). They note a wider array of actors who serve to implement and uphold 
this convergence process, including the European Commission (EC), the European Central 
Bank (ECB), the ECJ and European regulators (Johnston and Regan 2018: 148).  
These mechanisms and actors underpin the EU’s ‘technocratic attempt to promote a 
single (export-driven) and rules-based economic growth model among its diverse member-
states, to be achieved through austerity induced cost competitiveness’ (Johnston and Regan 
2018: 155). This has become particularly clear in the post-crisis period, wherein Germany 
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and the EU’s Northern states have ‘pushed the austerity agenda, which revolves around 
generating external and fiscal surpluses’ at the expense of struggling demand-led economies 
in the European South (Johnston and Regan 2018: 155). 
The limitations of existing EU integration ‘convergence’ theses 
 
We agree that the ‘clash of capitalisms’ is refracted through the institutions of EU economic 
governance. However, these literatures suffer from four conceptual limitations regarding the 
efficacy and coherence of EU integrative pressures on national capitalisms. First, these two 
literatures report strikingly contradictory conclusions. Whilst the first wave literature finds 
that the EU has actively promoted the ‘Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism’ (Höpner and 
Schäfer 2010), the second wave contends that this model is punished by the EU, which 
instead promotes a German-style export-led growth model (Johnston and Regan 2018).  
 This discrepancy results from their distinct analytical frameworks and empirical 
timeframes. Whilst Höpner and Schäfer construct their investigation around the VoC 
framework, which focuses on supply-side comparative advantage, Johnston and Regan use 
the GM perspective, which studies components of aggregate demand. As a result, Johnston 
and Regan admit a much more encompassing range of European integration elements, from 
financial integration to macroeconomic rules. Höpner and Schäfer focus exclusively on key 
aspects of the EU’s liberalising supply-side agenda, including mechanisms such as the EU’s 
Services Directive, corporate governance and company law. Second, Johnston and Regan’s 
framework is premised upon the post-2008 conjuncture, and attendant EU economic 
governance reforms, which explains the relative dominance of Germany. Höpner and 
Schäfer’s work, by contrast was developed before Europe’s turn to austerity was fully felt. 
That looking at different components of capitalist models at slightly different times leads to 
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opposite conclusions raises serious questions about frameworks which posit that any single 
model of capitalism is being induced by EU integrative pressures.  
Secondly, these two literatures reproduce prior limitations contained within the VoC 
and GM frameworks that underpin them. As Johnston and Regan (2018: 147-8) highlight 
themselves, the parsimonious bifurcation of national ‘varieties of capitalism’ within early 
VoC literature (Hall and Soskice 2001) has attracted a range of criticisms from scholars, 
including for overstating internal national capitalist homogeneity, and for its neglect of 
Eastern and Central European economies and the ‘rather awkward’ labelling of ‘mixed 
market economies’ (MMEs) in Southern Europe (e.g. Crouch 2005). In particular, as we 
explore further below, scholars note how France has either been side-lined within 
comparative capitalisms scholarship or somewhat clumsily classified as an MME (see 
Schmidt 2016; Clift 2012; 2016). More recently, VoC scholars have recognised the 
limitations of a model of change ‘built up around a one-dimensional continuum that runs 
from coordinated to liberal’ (Thelen 2014: 4).  
Schmidt (2016: 607) somewhat optimistically notes that ‘scholars seem to have come 
to agreement that capitalism is substantively more diverse than the varieties of capitalism 
dualism’. Yet, recent scholarship focused on ‘growth models’ regresses to repeat this fallacy 
(Baccaro and Pontusson 2016; Hope and Soskice 2016; Hall 2018). Johnston and Regan’s 
own framework, however, uncritically accepts the GM perspective which sees the EU ‘as a 
union of two different growth models’ (Johnston and Regan 2018: 150, emphasis added). The 
GM literature does not address the conceptual limitations of prior comparative capitalisms 
scholarship. Rather, it sidesteps critiques to offer its own parsimonious, bifurcating 
perspective. The upshot is that Johnston and Regan’s framework can similarly tell us little 
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about how European integration dynamics might shape a case such as France, which does not 
closely resemble either GM or VoC ideal-types.  
Consequently, the combined significance of these shortcomings leads us to a third 
limitation: these frameworks overstate and frame in too narrow terms the impact of European 
integration on national capitalisms. The process of European integration is multifaceted and 
produces a varied range integrative pressures, such that the above theses likely overstate the 
power and influence of the EU’s convergence-inducing force. There is considerable scope for 
non-conformity with EU-induced norms of capitalist organisation. Schmidt, for example, has 
identified the French model’s various departures from Single European Market (SEM) norms 
(1996, 1997). European integration initiatives present opportunities for increased variegation 
to policy actors in their import and mediation by institutions, governments, and national 
politics (Callaghan and Höpner 2005; Clift 2009a). 
This potential for increased differentiation within national capitalisms despite EU 
integration dynamics is increasingly salient amidst emergent disintegration dynamics. Thus, a 
fourth limitation of the above scholarship is its inability to understand or explain the 
implications of a new dynamic of European disintegration, particularly following the Brexit 
decision (see Webber 2014; Vollaard 2014; Zielonka 2014; Rosamond 2016, 2018; Jones 
2018). These developments challenge a teleological assumption of ever-increasing or stable 
integration within Europe contained within both frameworks (see Rosamond 2016: 865), 
wherein disintegration is either not considered or referred to fleetingly (Johnston and Regan 
2018: 146). Yet, as early empirical accounts indicate, Brexit is reshaping Europe’s 
competitive and regulatory dynamics, auguring financial market fragmentation (see Lavery et 
al. 2018; 2019; Quaglia and Howarth 2018). Drawing upon the nascent ‘disintegration’ 
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scholarship can deepen understanding of the varied European dynamics reshaping French 
capitalism. 
Post-dirigisme and the state-industry-finance nexus 
Unlike VoC and GM’s simple, bifurcating frameworks for understanding European capitalist 
restructuring, the concept of post-dirigisme foregrounds the possibility of ‘alternative types of 
capitalism distinguished by the extent and character of state intervention in the economy’ 
(Jackson and Deeg 2008: 699, see also Schmidt 2002, 2003, 2009), and demonstrates the 
need for variety within comparative capitalisms typologies which extends beyond two. The 
narrow-ness of existing comparative capitalism and EU integration frames emerges from 
their under-developed account of the state’s role in sustaining an economic regime. The VoC 
framework, in particular, fails to offer a compelling conception of state-market interactions 
and relations (see Levy 2006: 22-24). All this is unfortunate given the centrality of the 
interrelationship between state and market to capitalist development and diversity (Campbell 
2010: 94-8; Krippner 2011; Davis 2009: chapter 6; Dobbin 1994; Campbell and Lindberg 
1990; Fligstein 1996). In order to better account for this, we employ a ‘constructivist 
institutionalist’ (CI) framework, which views institutions as ‘built upon ideational 
foundations which exert an independent path dependent effect on their subsequent 
development’ (Hay 2008: 65; 2017). CI helps us to identify how distinctive national 
traditions of political economy and particular understandings of state/market relations both 
underpin and are reinforced by institutions, which in turn shape the behaviour of state actors 
(see Hay 2008: 63-4). To this end, CI recognises the conceptual contribution of post-
dirigisme in underscoring how ideational factors inform differentiated, variegated capitalist 
restructuring in ways not readily captured by the existing VoC and GM frameworks. 
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In order to define post-dirigisme, we need to both specify the motivations and 
understandings of state/market relations underpinning it and spell out the key transformations 
of the political economic context in which it arises. Post-dirigisme underscores how the 21st 
Century French state retains an ambition to shape how French capitalism and corporate 
governance evolves, akin to its post-War tutelle over firms (Shonfield 1969: 71-2; 128-50). 
This despite the partial retreat from the post-war dirigiste model and France’s shift towards 
liberalisation, deregulation, and privatisation (Hall 1986; Levy 1999; Schmidt 1997). In the 
1980s, French capitalist restructuring remained somewhat insulated from international 
competitive pressures by vestiges of dirigisme’s ‘protected capitalism’ (Schmidt 1996) logic. 
This was progressively eroded, in part by the process of European Single Market 
construction, and the dominant political economic model underpinning it. Following François 
Mitterrand’s 1983 U-turn away from expansionary Keynesianism and dirigiste 
nationalisation of key industries, Mitterrand saw remaining part of the EMS as a means to 
‘import’ German-influenced ordo-liberal conceptions of sound macroeconomic policy 
(Cameron 1996; Clift 2009b: 161; see also Hall 1994: 173-8). The revitalised European 
integration project drove liberalising re-regulation of European capital markets which 
prioritised shareholder value and transformed the context of corporate capitalism. The 
construction of the SEM was built upon markedly non-dirigiste foundations, drawing heavily 
on ordo-liberal anti-trust ideas which sought to undermine traditional dirigiste industrial 
policy tools, including state aid and industrial subsidies, protected sectors, and preferential 
public procurement (Clift 2009b: 162; see Ladrech 2000).  
The ‘post’ in post-dirigisme denotes a context in which French state orchestrated and 
facilitated transformations integral to French capitalism’s evolution as the process of 
European construction advanced. These resulted in considerably diminished dirigiste 
leverage. Firstly, large-scale privatisations reduced the state’s displacement within the 
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economy, altering its relation to the private sector yet counter-intuitively increasing inter-
penetration of public and private elites (Schmidt 1996). Secondly, overriding decades of 
French state antipathy towards foreign ownership, the internationalisation of French 
capitalism proceeded apace through large French firms’ transnational mergers and 
acquisitions and joint-ventures. Thirdly, the reliance on equity finance by French firms 
increased, and the scale of French equity in foreign hands became a distinctive feature of 
French capitalism. Fourthly, capital markets, and in particular corporate bond markets were 
reinvigorated and profoundly reformed, reducing French firms’ financial reliance on first the 
state, and then the banks. The constraints and opportunities of the SEM and France’s altered 
articulation with the global political economy are the crux of post-dirigisme (see also Cole 
2008; Levy 1999; Clift 2012; Massoc & Jabko 2012), which illustrates Howell’s ‘paradox of 
French state intervention’; ‘the French state has used its powers to undermine dirigisme and 
reduce state capacity’ (Howell 2009: 231, 249-53).  
For example, the arsenal of economic and financial policy tools used in the post-War 
dirigiste phase of the French model of capitalism had enabled the state and Trésor to act as 
banker and investor orchestrating national economic development, directing economic 
activity through strategic channelling of investment (Lemoine 2016: 45-59). The 
restructuring of the French financial system, and the French state’s place within it, saw the 
dismantling of administrative decrees, conduits and mechanisms such as the ‘Treasury 
circuit’ (Lemoine 2016: 48) through which French public debt was formerly channelled. 
Public debt issuance and management was shifted to a financial market basis, reducing the 
state’s autonomy and discretion, and changing the relations between the state, its financing, 
and financial markets profoundly (Lemoine 2016: 17-27). These shifts, Lemoine notes, were 
important precursors to how the ‘problem’ of French public debt was conceptualised amidst 
the Eurozone crisis and the politics of austerity.  
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Post-dirigisme recognises that these transformations entail a significant diminution in 
French state capacity and leverage to shape French capitalism (see e.g. Clift 2016; Howell 
2009; Levy 2008; Schmidt 2002; 2003; 2012). By comparison to the closely related concept 
of neo-dirigisme (Ansaloni & Smith 2018: 154), which contends that the dirigiste state ‘lives 
on’ in key areas of the French economy, post-dirigisme identifies more of a break with the 
past in terms the dynamics and modalities of French interventionism. Key state-orchestrated 
transformations of the French capitalist landscape, such as financial liberalisation, bond 
market development and internationalisation, have diminished French firms’ reliance on the 
state and eroded its role as a gatekeeper for flows of capital. 
The reduced viability and purchase of many old industrial policy tools means the 
logic of post-dirigisme involves the search for new modes of influence – both formal and 
informal – over economic development. French interventionism’s character is more 
‘permissive’, helping large firms to help themselves, rather than earlier ‘directive’ French 
industrial policy (Hall 2006). Sarkozy’s banking bailout demonstrated the oligarchic elitist 
and networked character of French post-dirigiste capitalism, and the prevailing comfort with 
‘free’, ‘competitive’ markets dominated by a few ‘national champions’ wielding significant 
market power. The small number of key players involved in shaping the plan shared close 
personal ties, forged at France’s ‘grandes écoles’, and the French state imposed no sanctions 
and few conditions during the bailout (Clift 2012; Jabko & Massoc 2012). This inter-
penetration of public and private is a characteristic feature of French post-dirigiste capitalism 
(Cohen 1996).  
Consistent with CI, a post-dirigiste account foregrounds the distinctive ideational 
context through which pressures for capitalist restructuring are refracted (see e.g. Woll 2008: 
8). This attention to how French corporate and state actors respond to changing economic 
conditions contrasts with VoC’s tendency to ‘emphasize rational, strategic behavior within a 
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set of fixed institutions’ (Jackson and Deeg 2008: 688, see also Hay 2005: 111-112). Rather 
than there being a single, universal notion of economic rationality, this more ideationally 
attuned account differentiates between diverse national traditions of economic thought, 
shaped by state traditions, institutions and decades of lived economic practice. Different 
conceptions of the market inform distinctive practices of market-making, and kinds of market 
operations. Unlike VoC-inspired interpretations, post-dirigisme places significant analytical 
focus on the state and the ongoing market-making inclinations of French state elites, who 
serve a crucial role as actors in and enactors of markets (Clift 2012: 566-9). It emphasises 
how particular conceptions of the market inform distinctive practices of market-making, and 
kinds of market operations. Institutionally, this approach has become embedded within 
French capitalism through, for instance, an elite education and civil servant training system 
(the grandes écoles and in particular the École Nationale d'Administration, or ENA), which 
supplies the French state with a relatively homogenous set of technocratic experts trained in 
the étatiste and dirigiste policymaking traditions (see Clift 2016: 15). Expectations of French 
market shaping interventionism are thus shared by French policy elites and many citizens, 
embedded within France’s ‘financial network economy’ (Morin 1998), a social context 
characterised by enduring interpenetrating public and private elitist networks (Dudouet and 
Grémont 2010). 
To illustrate the role of different understandings of state/market relations, we can 
contrast French post-dirigisme with German ordo-liberalism. Compared with post-war 
dirigisme, the French post-dirigiste state operates with the grain of the market, albeit a French 
conception of market, comfortable with permissive interventionism and selective 
liberalisation seeking to bolster international champions (Clift 2012). By contrast, ordo-
liberalism views the state as impartial guarantor of a constitutionally instituted competitive 
market order (through e.g. competition and anti-trust policy). In this vision firms, not the 
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state, are motors of growth. The EC embodies and polices an ordo-liberal anti-trust and 
competition policy stance. The dissonance between this, and the partiality of the French 
State’s post-dirigiste conception of the market is revealed in the friction between French 
authorities and the EC surrounding the bail-out during late 2008 (EC 2008: 13). Viewed in 
this light, we can see further limitations to the VoC/GM literatures with their bifurcating, 
functionalist frameworks. How states matter for capitalist development differs according to 
distinctive national traditions of political economy and particular understandings of 
state/market relations. 
At the European level, post-dirigisme highlights opportunities as well as constraints, 
and the ongoing instincts of the French state to shape European market-making. These 
dynamics are reflected in the ‘battle of the systems’ logic identified within notionally 
technocratic regulatory committees overseeing the European financial space (Story and 
Walter 1997; Quaglia 2007; 2010). National policy elites seek to mould European financial 
regulation in ways aligned with their own domestic financial system, and in the interests of 
their national financial services champions. French policy-makers have also sought to carve 
out new market-shaping opportunities within EU integration – seeking to regulate the 
European financial space in ways advantageous for French financial services (Jabko 2006; 
Gabor 2016). Post-dirigisme thus plays out both within and in response to EU integration, as 
the French state seeks to ‘reconcile the creation of a common economic space and the 
preservation of national discretion in areas valued highly by governments’ (Fioretos 2012: 
303).  
The instinct to retain national discretion inherent within dirigisme underlines 
limitations to how powerful a change-inducing force EU integration is within national 
capitalisms. The legacies of dirigisme, and the inter-penetration of public and private elitist 
networks of France’s ‘financial network economy’ (Morin 2000), mean that, within the 
17 
 
construction of the SEM, processes of French liberalisation operate according to significantly 
different dynamics. For instance, rather than merely deregulate and privatise, successive 
governments since the 1980s have overseen the construction of large national champion 
banking groups, controlled by a noyau dur (hardcore) of shareholders selected by the state, 
with the direction of these banks being given to select members of the grands corps, state 
elites such as ex-ministry of financial officials (Howarth 2013: 386; Clift 2004). The scope 
for and degree of state influence over private economic activity has lessened, yet French state 
actors continue to be ‘less focused on the level playing field prized by the British and 
Germans, more at ease with dominant market positions for their firms, and more open to state 
intervention to promote such market dominance’ (Schmidt 2016: 623).  
Another appeal of post-dirigisme as a framework over those outlined above is this 
greater ability to admit how EU integration pressures on capitalisms pull in different 
directions at the same time. This throws into relief how France’s model can evolve to emulate 
different models of capitalism at the same time. In some instances, the French state tried to 
make European financial markets in ways that manoeuvred French financial service firms 
into prime place, as in the case of repo market construction (Jabko 2006; Genito 2018, 2019; 
Gabor 2016). In other areas, as with ‘CMU 2.0’ the French strategy is to advance the 
financial liberalisation process. The paradox of post-dirigisme explains how France 
anachronistically responds to pressures arising from EU integration (and disintegration) – 
being at once hostile to financial market liberalisation, whilst also trying to steal a march on 
EU partners going farther and faster in financial market liberalisation in certain directions to 
take up market share. France’s liberalising evolution within the SEM in the realm of finance 
does not, for instance, necessarily mirror changes in the nature of its corporate governance 
arrangements. This raises the possibility that the EU’s influence, rather than inducing 
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coherence or singularity to European capitalisms, may in fact be reducing their coherence, 
and making them more fragmented.  
Post-dirigisme thus emphasises how ideational factors inform differentiated, 
variegated capitalist restructuring in ways not readily captured by only two types. In order to 
conduct our analysis of French capitalism post-crisis, we focus on the ‘state-industry-finance 
nexus’. This was a crucial characteristic of post-war dirigisme, central to elite efforts to shape 
the trajectory of France’s economic development, with the French state pulling the levers of 
economic management, retaining a stake in key firms, and channelling capital through the 
institutional allocation of credit (Zysman 1983; Loriaux 1991). Post-dirigisme speaks of 
reduced financial resources (due in part to weakened French public finances and the strictures 
of Euro area economic governance) and reduced institutional mechanisms and leverage 
(following the expansion, liberalisation, deepening and internationalisation of French 
financial markets) to achieve similar aims (O’Sullivan 2007; Clift 2012; Howarth 2013). 
Nevertheless, the state retains an ongoing ambition to shape French capitalism through the 
‘state-industry-finance nexus’.  
Crucially, therefore, aspects of our analysis are focused on attempts by French state 
actors to implement domestic policy or to shape European-level policy; we analyse policy 
developments in light of the broader model of capitalism in which they are embedded, and 
seek to understand the way in which French state actors have reacted to various material and 
institutional constraints in their attempts to protect French economic interests. The ultimate 
aims is to glean lessons about the contemporary nature of French capitalism. We analyse 
primary documentary material and information from over 30 elite interviews in order to build 
an empirical account of the contemporary relationships between the state, industry and 
finance focused on how French capitalism has been impacted by European integration and 
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disintegration in the post-crisis era. In particular, we explore state financing for industrial 
renewal, as well as the so-called ‘state shareholder strategy’ programme, and the French 
state’s regulatory and taxation reforms in relation to financial capital, both pre- and post-the 
Brexit vote.  
State-industry nexus: La nouvelle France industrielle ? 
In 2012, as the GFC and Eurozone crises drew on, the then-incoming Socialist administration 
announced its intention to reshape the French state’s relationship with both industry and 
finance, and renegotiate significant aspects of EU economic architecture, responding to what 
Hollande et al saw as a crisis of Anglo-liberal financialised capitalism (see McDaniel 2017). 
Hollande submitted plans to revitalise French industry through reviving more dirigiste policy 
approaches at domestic and European levels. His administration advocated a reorientation of 
the EU architecture along more Keynesian lines, promising the renegotiation of the new 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (Fiscal Compact), the creation of 
Eurobonds and a new European investment budget (2014-2020) (Hollande 2012a: 12-13). At 
the national level, a state-backed public investment bank (banque publique d’investissement, 
BPI) was launched, designed to boost targeted funding to small and medium size businesses 
and aid the transition towards green technology (Hollande 2012a: 7). Plans for an industrial 
investment programme, the second stage of the ‘future investment programme’ (programme 
d'investissements d'avenir or PIA2), were launched in July 2013. The September 2013 La 
Nouvelle France Industrielle programme involved a package of 34 plans designed to push 
France to the frontier of technological innovation.  
Much of this proposed programme was not, however, successfully implemented, 
partly because weak public finances left these policies under-funded (see Levy 2017: 620-1). 
Furthermore, there is some evidence to support Johnston and Regan’s (2018) contention that 
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promotion of an export-led model of growth within EU integration constrains the French state 
in the area of industrial strategy. However, the French case also serves to complicate 
Johnston and Regan’s (2018) interpretation, drawing attention to the importance of differing 
conceptions of state-market relations and not just the form of growth being promoted. In 
particular, by introducing this ideational element, we see how the EU’s promotion of a 
particular ordoliberal vision of export-led growth clashes with the more activist and dirigiste 
industrial instincts of French state actors attempting to promote export-led growth.  
The French state has sought to promote export-led growth. Yet, in line with post-
dirigisme, it has done so in a manner infused with distinctly dirigiste notions of the state’s 
role vis-à-vis markets, designed to promote ‘French interests’ in the area of industrial policy, 
not the EU’s ‘level playing field’. The BPI, for instance, was designed and vaunted by 
Hollande and other French officials as a necessary support mechanism for France’s exports 
through a series of financial loans and guarantees (Hollande 2012b; Moscovici 2012a; 
2012b). The Nouvelle France Industrielle programme, moreover, was promoted as reigniting 
a Colbertist flame at the heart of the French state (Franceinfo 2014). The French government 
spoke of the need to ‘put the tools of the State at the service’ of ‘the construction of centres of 
excellence’ capable of supporting exports concentrated in ‘high value-added sectors’ 
(Business France 2014: 5). Financial resources were channelled into high-skill, high-value 
firms and sectors, including on projects such as electric planes, driverless cars, robotics and 
cyber security (Gouvernement français 2014).  
Amidst a continent-wide shift towards fiscal consolidation, Hollande’s EU-level 
reforms sought to significantly strengthen France’s fiscal capacity and enable a more 
ambitious industrial renewal programme. His proposed new European investment budget was 
designed to support the ‘grands projets of the future’ and the creation of ‘new financial tools 
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in order to launch innovative industrial programmes, notably in the areas of green 
technology’ (Hollande 2012a: 12-13). The French state’s active support of high-quality, high-
value export-oriented market actors was reminiscent of the ‘national champions’ strategy of 
les trente glorieuses, wherein companies were ‘groomed to carry the colors of France on the 
battlefield of the new international economic order’ (Hall 1986: 149). At domestic and 
European levels, then, the French state’s industrial ambition envisaged an active, dirigiste, 
market-making role for both the nation state and the EU in the post-crisis period.  
Despite the industrial policy revival within the French state’s economic ambitions, 
however, EU integrative pressures promoted an altogether different conception of export-led 
growth. France’s weakened influence vis-à-vis Germany, it quickly emerged, limited French 
aspirations for EU reform. Within weeks of Hollande’s victory, the Fiscal Compact was 
signed unamended into French law. Financial pressures emanating from the parlous state of 
France’s public finances alongside EU pressure to pursue fiscal consolidation saw the French 
state’s industrial ambitions scaled down. As Levy (2017: 620) notes, for instance, the €12 
billion for PIA2 represented significantly reduced investment when compared to the €35 
billion pledged by Sarkozy in 2009 under the original PIA scheme. State funding for industry 
was never, therefore, going to facilitate a return of the dirigiste state. Furthermore, 
Hollande’s ‘European investment budget’ plans were, as the French business daily Les Echos 
(2013) put it, ‘massacred’ by the finally agreed Budget, whilst the new European ‘project 
bonds’ –infrastructure project loans worth up to €1 billion drawn from the existing EU 
current budget - represented a heavily diluted form of France’s proposed Eurobond scheme. 
Following this failure to reform Europe, the French state signalled a shift in its 
industrial strategy towards enabling greater cost competitiveness for French firms. In the 
context of pressure from Germany, which had pushed France from the outset of Hollande’s 
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presidency to pursue labour market reform (Government advisor, personal interview, 
10.05.16), a government commissioned report, le rapport Gallois, explicitly sought French 
convergence on the German model of capitalism through greater labour market flexibility and 
wage cost reductions. In turn, starting in 2013, the government offered up a €20 billion tax 
credit for businesses (crédit d’impôt pour la compétitivité et l’emploi, or CICE), which was 
followed by January 2014’s Pacte de Responsabilité, an additional €30 billion tax cut 
designed to reduce the labour costs throughout the quinquennat. Rather than an industrial 
strategy per se, the state’s new focus was on supply-side reform initiatives to promote 
education, research and ‘innovation and business development’ (see Commissariat Général à 
l'investissement 2016), resulting in a discernible shift in value-added from labour to capital 
(OFCE 2016: 2). 
The attempt and ultimate failure to implement a more activist industrial strategy, as 
well as the shift towards a more supply-side oriented programme, highlights some of the 
limitations of the French state as an agent of transformation within French capitalism. Yet, it 
would be wrong to characterise French capitalist adjustment entirely in terms of ordoliberal 
convergence. The French state continued to actively promote ‘French interests’ through 
industrial policy, despite pressures emanating from EU integration, at times actively 
contravening EU anti-trust norms. Through the BPI and the ‘state shareholder strategy’ (SSS) 
programme, state actors exploited the political and economic space available to further 
French interests, in ways typical of post-dirigisme.  
From 2012, the BPI channelled funding to French firms (Grandguillaume and 
Louwagie 2015; Cour des comptes 2016: 145), yet this placed the BPI in a tricky position 
vis-à-vis the ECB’s supervision and EU rules on state aid. French authorities justified the 
BPI’s role to the EC stating that it only intervenes to support struggling firms in ‘exceptional 
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cases’ and otherwise operates in normal market conditions like any other private market actor 
(Cour des comptes 2016: 45, 64). European antitrust rules, moreover, prohibited the direct 
financing of certain pilot projects under the Nouvelle France Industrielle programme. Despite 
this, to circumvent EU anti-trust laws, the state set up a €425 million fund managed by the 
BPI enabling it to intervene as a prudent investor (La Fabrique de l’industrie 2015: 3; Usine 
digitale 2015). This was no return to levels of state involvement and investment of the 
dirigiste heyday. Nevertheless, the French state embraces a more dirigiste (mis)reading of EU 
antitrust rules to support its own national economic interests. This episode highlights long-
standing selective adherence in France to SEM rules banning state-aid (see Schmidt 1997: 
239; Schmidt 1996),2 and illustrates the ongoing ‘clash of capitalisms’ at the heart of 
European economic governance, between a French dirigiste vision and EU level (German 
inspired) ordoliberalism. 
Similar characteristics are found in corporate governance with the development of 
French ‘double voting rights’, and the SSS programme, which positions the French state as 
‘an equity investor in companies deemed as strategically important’ and ‘operating in critical 
areas for France’s sovereignty’ (Le ministère de l'Économie et des Finances 2014: 16; 2016: 
20). Uproar surrounding closures at ArcelorMittal’s Florange steel production site in 2012 led 
to the so-called Florange Act in March 2014. This established double voting rights for 
shareholders holding an equity stake for two years or more, rewarding patient capital. It 
primarily serves to strengthen the ‘hardcore’ of domestic investors, including the state itself, 
over foreign interests, such as ArcelorMittal. The French state utilised SSS tools to extend its 
influence over private capital despite limited fiscal means. For instance, the government’s 
€800 million investment in Groupe PSA in April 2014 was designed to counter the growing 
                                                          
2 This more liberal adaptation of EU rules by French state actors can also be seen in relation to European fiscal 
rules, where French authorities have rejected the EC’s assessments on the Fiscal Compact in favour of its own 
(Clift and Ryner 2014: 153; Clift 2016: 527). 
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influence of Chinese firm Dongfeng Motors (see LCI 2016). In 2015, the government 
actively sought to increase its share in companies such as Renault and Air France-KLM in 
order to benefit from double voting rights in the company’s governing bodies, as provided for 
under the Florange Act (Le ministère de l'Économie et des Finances 2016: 21).  
Consistent with the concept of post-dirigisme, the financial resources and direct 
control of the post-War dirigiste state have clearly eroded; reports by the Cour des comptes 
(2016; 147; 2017: 50-1, 131-2) highlight the weak financial foundations of both the BPI and 
the SSS programme. The liberalising reforms of President Macron could, however, further 
undermine its relevance. Macron’s Economy Minister, Bruno Le Maire, stated his desire to 
scale back the state’s financial involvement in firms, including the SSS, and to retain large 
stakes only in those companies with key strategic relevance to the state (Jacqué 2017). In the 
summer of 2018, for instance, the government sold off state holdings were worth an 
estimated €15 billion in companies such as ADP (airports operator) and Engie (energy firm). 
Le Maire has suggested that the government’s intention is to ‘redefine the role of the state in 
the economy’ and that the state ‘is better able to defend the public interest through regulation 
rather than having a presence in capital’ (cited in Lefebvre and Honoré 2018).  
Macron’s liberalising agenda could thus erode elements of the post-dirigiste model of 
industrial capitalism in France. That said, in the post-crisis period so far, the evidence 
available tells us that French state elites have by and large actively sought to extend their 
reach and influence vis-à-vis private capital, despite reduced government capacity. EU 
integrative dynamics have promoted a particular ordoliberal conception of export-led growth, 
but there has not been a clear convergence of European capitalist models in this case. Rather, 
we have seen the reinforcement of the post-dirigiste state at the heart of the French model of 
capitalism, evidenced in its ‘market-making’ conception of industrial activism to support 
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selected French firms and sectors, and willingness to bend and alter institutional frameworks 
in order to extend its influence.  
State-finance nexus: Regulating financial capital pre- and post-Brexit 
Somewhat paradoxically, although French financial market liberalisation in the mid-1980s 
served to legitimise EU-level financial market integration (Jabko 2006: 71; Fioretos 2012), 
French state actors have remained hostile to more liberal approaches to economic and 
financial integration led by the UK (see Schmidt 2016: 606). Though reticent about it, 
Mitterrand viewed European capital liberalisation as the bitter medicine France required as 
the European Community’s ‘bad student’ (Jabko 2006: 75). French elites have nonetheless 
consistently sought to uphold a tougher regulatory regime and support the wider goal of 
French economic power in Europe. France has always been part of an advocacy coalition 
within the EU with more critical instincts and beliefs about the nature of the market than 
countries such as the UK (Quaglia 2010). More recently France has expressed reservations 
about the EC’s post-GFC Capital Markets Unions (CMU) project – an initiative supported by 
the UK (Quaglia et al. 2016: 198-99).  
Initial French support for financial market integration in Europe was underpinned by 
French Treasury proposals in 2000 to create a Paris-based European super-regulator, which 
would have delivered significant benefits for Paris as a financial centre (Quaglia 2007: 282). 
Similarly, where France has led the way in financial market liberalisation, such as in the 
creation of a repo market, this has often been influenced by a desire to counterbalance 
German power, such as by designating France as the benchmark issuer of euro-denominated 
government debt (Gabor 2016: 976). Nevertheless, consistent with Höpner and Schäfer’s 




The GFC, however, was seen to discredit the more liberal approach to financial 
market integration which had dominated EU discourse in the 1990s and 2000s (see Quaglia 
2010). In this context, as with industrial policy, the incoming Socialist administration in 2012 
promised to redraw the relationship between the state and financial capital. It pledged to 
constrain the power of untamed financial capitalism, proposing to increase the tax rate on 
bank profits, prohibit some ‘toxic’ financial products (particularly ‘naked’ credit default 
swaps), fight tax fraud, proscribe French banks from operating in tax havens, and to separate 
the retail and investment arms of French banks (see Hollande 2012a: 10). French state actors 
in 2012 were also at the forefront of attempts to construct an EU-wide financial transaction 
tax (FTT).  
Such proposals, if successfully implemented, could have marked a shift back towards 
a more interventionist French state and more muscular market-shaping re-regulation of 
financial capitalism. However, only modest incremental reforms resulted from these 
aspirations, with the French state’s capacity to reshape the state-finance nexus curtailed by 
powerful private financial institutions’ ability of to circumnavigate re-regulation in a 
changing regulatory landscape.3 Highlighting how French capitalist restructuring pulls in 
different directions, the French state under Hollande and then Macron has increasingly come 
to embrace liberalised financial capitalism. This shift began with the installation of a new 
pro-business government under Prime Minister Valls in 2014, with Emmanuel Macron as 
Economy and Finance Ministry. The Socialist administration, for instance, became 
increasingly interested in measures designed to facilitate ‘participative finance’ such as 
crowdfunding and blockchain technology. In tandem, France’s financial market regulatory 
                                                          
3 The FTT, for instance, whilst raising close to €1 billion each year in revenue does not tackle the ‘harmful’ 
financial practices it set out to (Migaud 2017). Furthermore, although on paper a law was passed to separate 
retail and investment banking activities, the law is narrowly defined and impacts only around 1 per cent of the 
banking activities of France’s two largest banks (see Pinson 2015). 
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body, the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), took unprecedented pro-finance steps 
during this period, including joining forces with the French Asset Management Association 
(Association Française de la Gestion Financière, AFG) in February 2016, in order to ‘raise 
the profile and broaden the distribution’ of French-domiciled funds abroad (AMF 2016).  
 This approach was given a shot in the arm following Britain’s decision to leave the 
EU (see Lavery et al. 2018; 2019). The Brexit vote was seen by state actors as a significant 
opportunity to increase the prominence of finance within the wider French model of 
capitalism, and in doing so contribute to a new phase of economic growth after several 
sluggish years. President Hollande argued, for example, that France ‘must adapt our rules, 
including tax rules, to make the financial centre of Paris more attractive’ (cited in Les Echos 
2016). The desire to make Paris, in the words of Prime Minister Valls, ‘Europe’s premiere 
financial centre’ (cited in Chaperon 2016) resulted in an unprecedented ‘joint mobilization of 
all public authorities and the private sector’, including both national and local government 
officials, lobby groups such as Paris EUROPLACE, private banks and other private finance 
firms (de Montgolfier 2017: 71). Furthermore, it served to alter the scope of the regulatory 
and taxation regime at the heart of French capitalism. As a report by the Sénat notes, the 
French state took ‘concrete actions aimed at facilitating the relocation of [financial] actors’ 
(de Montgolfier 2017: 72). The Valls government lowered corporation tax to 28 per cent and 
extended a tax benefit for those coming to work in France or ex-pats returning (the régime 
des impatriés) in order to attract finance workers. In September 2016, moreover, the AMF 
and the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR), jointly defined procedures to 
accelerate and simplify investments and takeovers of activities already carried out in France, 
including permitting applications to be made in English. Similarly, the AMF opened a 
dedicated ‘welcoming’ programme, ‘Agility’, to help fund management and FinTech firms 
register in France, permitting approval within a two-week period. Efforts centred around 
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capturing what Lavery et al. (2018) term ‘low hanging fruit’, financial activities potentially 
searching for a new base within the EU, including FinTech and euro-denominated clearing. 
This strategy intensified under President Emmanuel Macron. As a former investment 
banker, Macron led the charge to continue Paris’ aggressive lobbying campaign to attract 
financial activity leaving the City. The first Macron budget, implemented in January 2018, 
pruned back France’s tax regime further, making explicit reference to ‘increasing the 
economic attractiveness of France, particularly in the context of "Brexit"’ as a driving factor 
(Gouvernement français 2017: 12). Policies included further slashing corporate tax to 25 per 
cent by 2022, income tax reductions, a significant narrowing of France’s wealth tax, a new 30 
per cent flat rate on capital gains, and the repeal of an extension to France’s FTT which saw it 
cover intraday trading for the first time just a year after it was enacted.  
Prime Minister Édouard Philippe suggested improving France’s attractiveness was ‘a 
global approach that goes beyond the regulatory and fiscal framework’ (Premier Ministre 
2018: 3). The financial sector is increasingly seen as the most effective means through which 
to finance companies and, by extension, promote economic growth; the government, for 
instance, boasts that the financial industry's contribution to GDP is ‘ten times higher than that 
of the automobile industry’ (Premier Ministre 2018: 19). Measures central to the Macron 
administration’s strategy, such as loosening financial regulatory standards and softening the 
taxation regime, are thus intended as part of a wider shift in the nature of France’s model of 
capitalism, carried out in the name of ‘economic attractiveness’. The state’s desire to open up 
the economy to financial capital has, moreover, necessitated some adjustments in relation to 
the EU. The Macron administration has, for instance, sought to eliminate what it calls the 
‘over-transposition of European Union law’ on financial regulation and supervision (Premier 
Ministre 2018: 11). Given France’s traditional role in supporting tough regulatory standards 
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within the EU, this is a telling development that highlights the French state’s changing 
approach towards finance and the way in which it is actively mobilising to ensure that it does 
not ‘lose out’ to European neighbours in the context of Brexit. 
The CMU project an interesting case in point in this regard. Whilst France was 
initially hesitant over post-GFC plans to push CMU development, post-Brexit the CMU 
project had lost its biggest advocate in the UK (Lavery 2017). Since Macron’s election on a 
pro-EU ticket, French authorities have seen the CMU project in a more positive light. Rather 
than bolstering the UK’s financial dominance in Europe, CMU could be harnessed to the 
familiar ‘battle of systems’ logic (Story and Walter 1997; Quaglia 2007; 2010), to support 
and enhance French power within the Eurozone. In particular, French authorities called to 
support CMU through empowering the Paris-based European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) (Ophèle 2018; see Mooney and Thompson 2017). Centralising financial 
supervision in Europe would protect against French fears of post-Brexit ‘regulatory 
arbitrage’, wherein other national financial regulators undermine EU supervisory standards in 
order to encourage investment (see Mooney and Thompson 2017). Moreover, as in 2000, the 
empowerment of this European super-regulator based in Paris can be seen as a strategic 
manoeuvre designed to both boost the influence of Paris as a European financial centre and 
situate French financial regulatory norms at the forefront of any future integrative project. 
Indeed, the French authorities have been quick to highlight the benefits of ESMA being 
located in Paris (Premier Ministre 2018: 17). 
It should be noted that, despite liberalising government efforts, France has not yet 
experienced a significant shift towards a finance-led model of capitalism; OECD (2017) data 
shows financial services as a proportion of the French economy has remained stable since the 
1970s. Yet France shows signs of a potential shift, à la Höpner and Schäfer and contra 
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Johnston and Regan, towards a more liberal market economy, in the area of financial 
capitalism at least. Importantly, however, this shift has not occurred as a result of European 
integration, but rather European disintegration. The post-dirigiste state is actively mobilising 
to enhance the position of financial capital within French capitalism, exploiting the political 
space opened up by Brexit. European disintegrative dynamics are thus critical to the story of 
French capitalist adjustment and ongoing financial markets liberalisation in France. 
Nonetheless, post-dirigisme, not a liberal financialised model, continues to most accurately 
capture the nature of French capitalism today.  
Conclusion 
European integration manifestly constrains and shapes national capitalisms (Fioretos 2012). 
Yet, the existing first-wave (Höpner and Schäfer 2010) and second-wave (Johnston and 
Regan 2018) frameworks for understanding this, we have argued, contain a number of 
conceptual limitations and cannot fully explain change within some of Europe’s most 
important political economies. This article has sought to explore these limitations through the 
case of French capitalist restructuring pre- and post- the Brexit vote. 
The concept of post-dirigisme speaks to a greater complexity and variety of capitalist 
restructuring dynamics than the simple bifurcation of liberal/coordinated or demand/export-
led growth. Post-dirigisme underscores how the French state has continued to assert its 
influence in the area of industrial activism and has taken an active market-shaping role in 
seeking to profit from the political opportunity created by Brexit. Post-dirigiste analysis is in 
many ways a fellow traveller with the neo-dirigiste account (Ansaloni & Smith 2018), 
although it underlines reduced state leverage, and identifies fewer continuities from the 
dirigiste period. Post-dirigisme goes further in spelling out the altered domestic and 
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international context of French economic interventionism, which entail qualitative changes to 
earlier dirigiste institutions and practices. 
 This article has offered a granular account of the ideational conditions of the 
restructuring and reproduction of national capitalisms through analysis of the impact of 
integrative and disintegrative dynamics in the areas of industrial strategy and financial 
capitalism in France. Future work could explore other critical areas of the French political 
economy not touched upon here. The above analysis has demonstrated the need to consider 
how different conceptions of the market underpin the ongoing ‘clash of capitalisms’ 
surrounding efforts to reshape and re-regulate Europe’s financial space. That is, it highlights 
the distinction between a particular ordoliberal conception of state-market relations, 
promoted by the EU, and the more traditionally French dirigiste visions of the state. Focusing 
on this ideational level, and conceptions of the market, as here, facilitates placing the pursuit 
of particular economic policies in the context of wider models of capitalism.  
Macron’s presidency augurs the incorporation of some more liberal elements into 
French capitalism in the realms of taxation and labour market reform. Yet this is reconciled to 
familiar French ambitions develop and support high value export firms the market-making re-
regulation at the national and European levels. Macron’s aspirations to reform the European 
political economy present, in post-dirigiste fashion, distinctive opportunities for French 
international champions. This all suggests that contemporary transformations in European 
capitalisms can more helpfully be understood in terms of variegation and hybridisation, each 
of which can be pushed further by both EU integration and EU disintegration dynamics. This, 
rather than pigeon-holing political economies within the restrictive dualisms of either VoC or 
the GM perspective, offers more promising avenues for future comparative capitalisms 
research. This account thus highlights how existing frameworks have overstated and 
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conceived in overly narrow terms the impact of EU integration on national capitalisms, and 
points to the blind-spot around the dynamics of European disintegration that must become 
central to future comparative study of national capitalisms in Europe. 
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